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 Abstract 
Despite the general belief among economists on the growth-enhancing role of international 
trade and significant trade opening over the past 25 years, the growth performance of many 
developing economies, especially of those in Latin America and Africa, has been 
disappointing. While this poor growth performance has many potential causes, in this paper I 
argue that part of the reason may be related to the interaction between weak institutions and 
trade. In particular, I construct a model in which trade opening in societies with weak 
institutions (in particular autocratic and elite-controlled political systems) may lead to worse 
economic policies. The reason is that general equilibrium price effects of taxation and 
expropriation in closed economies also hurt the elites, and this puts a natural barrier against 
inefficient policies. Trade openness removes this barrier and enables groups with political 
power to exercise this power in more inefficient ways. 
Keywords: Institutions, Political Economy, Expropriation, Property Rights, International 
Trade. 
JEL Codes: O10, P16, F10. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
Increasing globalization has been a defining feature of the postwar era. There is some
consensus that this has been beneficial for economic performance: trade brings about a more
e!cient allocation of resources through technology or factor endowment driven comparative
advantage, or through better exploitation of increasing returns to scale. Figure 1 gives a
sense of this. Countries that traded more between 1960 and 1995 appear to have larger per
capita incomes today.1
At the same time, some less-developed economies have seen little improvement in eco-
nomic performance since the 1960’s. Figure 2 splits Figure 1 in two. On the top are countries
that, from 1960 to 2000, had on average limited or no constraints on executive power (non-
democratic regimes). The bottom section shows countries with strong checks on the executive
power over the same period (more democratic regimes). A positive correlation between trade
and income holds for more democratic countries, but for less democratic regimes there is no
positive correlation. It could be argued that this is unrelated to globalization, or that these
countries have not opened to trade enough to benefit from it. However, trade as a share
of GDP in those countries has increased from an average of 33% in 1960, to an average of
almost 60% in 2000.2 Although most trade takes place between developed nations, it is still
true that less-developed economies today trade much more than they did 40 years ago.
The alternative view developed in this paper is that our standard trade models are missing
an important ingredient. If we are to look for a fundamental dierence between countries in
the North and countries in the South that might aect trade predictions, institutions stand
out as a clear candidate. How do institutions in the North dier from those in the South? The
answer is straightforward: institutions in the South tend to be less e!cient, their economies
are characterized by corruption, expropriation, or weak property rights protection.
Do countries with ine!cient institutions, then, benefit from trade in the way our stan-
dard models would predict? Trade theories typically formalize dierences in institutions as
dierences in exogenous parameters or dierences in productivity. But institutions in the
South are ine!cient in a distorting way: groups with political power tend to extract rents
from other groups in society, which aects the incentives in these economies. Such ine!-
ciencies can alter standard trade predictions in two ways. First, they can have distributive
consequences: winners and losers from the process of trade integration may dier from those
predicted by standard theories.3 Second, trade might aect the ine!ciency of institutions
1We are aware of the standard omitted variable and reverse causality problems. We are just describing
correlations.
2The measure we are using is exports plus imports as a share of GDP from the Penn World Tables.
3Levchenko (2004) is an example of this.
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itself. Exogenous differences in productivity parameters are not likely to capture the effects
of institutional variance.
The main contribution of this paper is to answer this question, endogenizing the efficiency
of institutions and analyzing how this efficiency changes when economies open to interna-
tional trade. I argue that part of the reason why less-developed economies may not have
benefited from international trade is that, in countries with weak or non-democratic political
institutions, trade liberalization may lead to worse policies and economic institutions. The
reasoning is simple: in a closed economy, groups that hold political power are restrained
in the degree to which they may indulge inefficient redistributive policies, such as corrup-
tion or expropriation, because of the general equilibrium price effects such policies create.
Increased international trade removes these price effects, and may increase the intensity of
rent-extracting policies to the point where it more than outweighs for standard trade gains.
In such situations, trade may not be welfare enhancing.
To examine this issue, I build on Acemoglu (2006), which provides a framework to help
understand why inefficient institutions emerge. The starting point of my paper is a society
that already has an elite with a preference for inefficient policies in place. In particular,
I start with a set of political institutions that give all political power to an elite minority.
This power allows the elite to benefit from its policies regardless of how they affect the rest
of society. Throughout this paper, this state is the definition of the term “dictatorship.”
The key policies in this model are group specific tax rates, which are distortionary. In this
model there are no other means to extract resources from non-elite groups. The definition
of taxation in this discussion is broad: it is any policy that leads to investment distortions
in the economy (such as expropriation or corruption).
I focus on two sources of inefficiency in policies, both arising from the desire and ability
of the elite to extract resources from other groups. First, the elite might set distortionary
taxes to extract revenue from other groups. We refer to this as Revenue Extraction. Second,
because they participate in production activities, the elite producers can also benefit through
an indirect channel. By taxing other groups with production activities, they reduce the
demand for factors of these groups. This benefits them through lower factor prices and
higher profits. We refer to this second source of inefficiency as Factor Price Manipulation.
The degree of expropriation in the economy and its effect will depend on the strength of
these two sources of inefficiencies.
I first analyze the closed economy. In Acemoglu (2006), elite and non-elite producers
compete in the same sector; i.e., products of both groups are perfect substitutes.4 I depart
from that assumption by allowing elite and non-elite producers to produce in different sectors
4Additionally, Acemoglu (2006) only analyzes a closed economy.
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and assuming that these sectors have certain complementarity. This immediately implies a
natural restriction on the extent to which the elite can either extract resources from the
middle class or modify factor prices. Any taxes the elite place on the middle class will come
back to aect them. Higher taxes will imply a higher cost for the consumption bundle,
which will reduce the real value of the elites’ income. And this is true for both sources
of ine!ciency, Revenue Extraction and Factor Price Manipulation. Taxing these non-elite
groups will not only directly reduce non-elite producers investment (the standard Laer
Curve eect) but also, because goods produced by these non-elite producers will become
more expensive, reduce the value of the elite’s profits. In other words, as long as the elite
consumes what non-elite groups produce, the elite will find expropriation and excessive
taxation less desirable because these policies will make consumption more expensive.
The key assumption in this analysis is that elite producers care, not only about tax
revenues, but also about profits. This encourages them to tax both sectors asymmetrically,
since taxing themselves hurts profits. But taxing sectors dierently distorts the relative price
and allocation of resources in the economy. And this also reduces profits through the general
equilibrium: a tax on the middle class decreases the relative price of the goods produced by
the elite, which decreases profits. This is what limits the elite from taxing other groups as
much as they would like.
Opening the economy to trade will increase competition, which will increase the substi-
tutability between goods produced by elite and non-elite producers. In other words, trade
will reduce the negative general equilibrium eect (on the elites’ income) of taxing these
other groups; now, the elite can find most goods in world markets. This frees the elite to
take full advantage of their policy control, translating into greater ine!ciency as taxes rise
aggressively on all other groups. The welfare implications of opening to trade will depend
on whether the increase in expropriation more than outweighs for the standard gains from
trade. The most important result of this paper is its assertion that, in dictatorial states,
international trade is not necessarily welfare improving for the whole economy.
I then repeat the analysis for a democracy, which we define as political institutions that
give all political power to the majority. A democracy with a closed economy will be ine!cient
to some extent, although generally less ine!cient than a dictatorship. The surprising result
is that once we open to trade, policies do not necessarily become more e!cient; instead, they
remain constant. A look at the nature of our democratic model explains this. A democracy
gives the political power to the majority, and in our model that majority is comprised of
workers. Since workers participate in both sectors of the economy, they will try not to distort
resource allocation across sectors. Also, workers care about wages (not profits), which implies
that the general equilibrium eect will not restrain them from achieving their desired tax
4
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rates. When the country opens to trade, workers will set the same tax rates as in the closed
economy, and opening to trade will not have a negative eect on the e!ciency of policies.
Trade is always welfare enhancing under a democracy.
The main contribution of this paper is to emphasize the negative impact that trade has
on expropriation and income of countries with weak political institutions, by making non-
elite and elite sectors more substitutable. The literature has emphasized how globalization,
by allowing capital mobility, leads to lower taxation. I abstract from this mechanism by
assuming that there is no international factor mobility.5 The paper most closely related to
this one, in spirit, is Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).6 In their model, an oligarchy of capi-
talists, operating in an economy with missing financial markets for the financing of human
and physical capital investments, might find it in their interest to subsidize the education
of the poor because both types of capital are complementary. Political participation in this
model is linked to education, which means that the elite are willing to subsidize education
despite the cost in terms of political power. With international financial integration, the
return on investments of the capitalist is given by the international rate of interest, which
breaks the complementarity between human capital and capital accumulation. The elite may
stop subsidizing the education of the poor, which implies a reinforcement of their political
power.7 Notice the dierences between their approach and mine. Their paper looks at how,
for a given degree of ine!ciency, political institutions change with trade.8 My paper instead
takes institutions as given and analyzes the change in their ine!ciency. Also their paper is
about whether trade delays or not democratization, not about the eects on Welfare.9
This paper is of course related to Segura-Cayuela (2006a), which shows empirical evidence
on the relevance of the forces at play in the current paper.10 This paper is also related to
Epifani and Gancia (2005), who analyze the size of governments in the context of benevolent
rulers that provide a public good. Because trade shifts part of the tax burden away, trade
integration in such situations leads to higher taxation and bigger government. But the
mechanics of their model are very dierent to mine. First, there is no distinction between
5It is not obvious how this might aect the results of the paper. To add this mechanism, we would have
to think carefully about who owns the capital in the economy. It seems safe to assume, for present purposes,
that in underdeveloped economies capital is in the elite’s hands.
6In Bourguignon and Verdier (2005), the authors make a similar argument in the context of trade inte-
gration and factor mobility.
7Verdier (2005) provides a good discussion on how trade might aect domestic policy.
8By ine!ciency in their model I mean the lack of financial markets.
9Of course democratization can have eects on Welfare. But there is no explicit discussion of the con-
sequences in the context of their model. In their model, liberalizing financial markets slows human capital
accumulation, but increases physical capital accumulation.
10In that paper I show evidence that expropriation increases with trade opening for non-democratic coun-
tries, while it is reduced for democratic ones, consistent with the main theoretical prediction of this paper.
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good/bad political institution. Their analysis is about benevolent governments providing
public goods. Also, taxation at home increases because foreigners pay some of it, through
prices of imports. In my model taxation increases irrespective of who exports or imports. All
it matters is that goods produced by the middle class can be found somewhere else. Finally,
this paper is related also to the recent literature on the eect of trade on institutions,
Levchenko (2004), Segura Cayuela (2006b), Do and Levchenko (2005), Galor and Mountford
(2006), and chapter 10 on Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), among others.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic economic
model and characterizes the economic and political equilibrium in a closed economy under a
dictatorship of the elite. Section 3 repeats the exercises in Section 2, but for an open economy.
Section 4 analyzes the welfare implications of opening to trade. Section 5 discusses how the
analysis changes under a democracy. Finally Section 6 concludes.
2 The General Model with a Closed Economy
This section develops the basic economic model in a closed economy, where ine!ciencies
will arise due to limited checks on the executive power and the desire of the minority elite
to extract rents from other groups in society. I will first solve for the economic equilibrium
for a given set of policies, and then I will characterize the political equilibrium. I start by
describing the general environment.
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy, closed to international trade for the time being, populated by a
continuum of agents 1+h+p that consume a single final good, |. Preferences of the agents
are defined as
X = |=
The final good is produced by combining two intermediate inputs, |h and |p> according to
technology
| = 3(1 )3(13) (|h) (|p)13 > (1)
where I define "  3(1  )3(13)= There are three groups of agents. First, a mass 1
of workers, endowed with 1 unit of labor each, which they supply inelastically. Second, the
middle class producers, denoted by p, who have access to production opportunities in sector
11For the eects of institutions in trade/FDI, see for instance Levchenko(2004), Antràs (2003, 2005), or
Antràs and Helpman (2005).
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p. Finally, the elite producers, h, who also have access to production opportunities in sector
h and hold the political power.12
Technology is identical in both sectors,
|ml =
1
1 
¡
nml
¢13 ¡
oml
¢
> (2)
where |ml stands for production of individual l of group m, n denotes capital and o labor.
Capital is assumed to fully depreciate after use.13 In what follows, total variables for a
group will simply be the value of that variable for an individual of that group, times the size
of that group, m, m=
The political power in this model will be in the hands of the elite.14 They have the ability
to decide policies and choose those that benefit them the most. The only policies in this
model consist of the ability to tax the activity of both intermediate sectors with a rate  m.
Again, we should interpret the concept of taxation in a broader sense: it could correspond
to expropriation, or corruption, or any policy used by the elite to repress the middle class
that translates into distortions in the economy.
Let us assume the following timing of events: first, taxes are set, then, investments are
made. This way, we can abstract from ine!ciencies due to hold-up problems, which could
be interesting to analyze but are not the scope of this paper. Revenue from taxation can
be distributed across groups with targeted lump-sum transfers towards each group, W m  0.
The government budget constraint is
Wz + pWp + hW h  !
Z
m>l
 msm|ml glgm> (3)
where sm denotes the price of good m and ! is a parameter that measures the ability of the
elite to collect and redistribute taxes, state capacity. In less-developed economies, fiscal
systems are typically ine!cient; this is due to large informal economies or corruption in the
collection of taxes, for instance. So it should be natural to think that ! ? 1 for this type of
economy: what the government redistributes is less than what it collects. For most of the
analysis in this paper I will assume that this is the case, although I will discuss the results
for ! = 1 too. Notice that there are no other fiscal instruments, only distortionary taxes,
12Most of the analysis in this paper would stand if I allowed both groups to produce in both sectors
with dierent productivities. The assumption that they each produce in only one of the sectors reduces the
taxonomy of cases to analyze.
13A discussion of this assumption is found in Segura Cayuela (2006b).
14I assume that the elite producers hold the political power until I analyze the model in the context of a
democracy. But for the analysis in this section, the economic equilibrium, who holds the political power will
be irrelevant.
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which will be the root for the ine!ciency of policies.
There is a maximum scale, om  > for each firm. And each member of a group can just
set up one firm. The role of this assumption is to generate profits in equilibrium: if a group
of producers reach their maximum scale, they will make profits. Notice that if
h + p ? 1> (4)
there is going to be excess labor supply in this economy, the total amount of labor that both
groups demand is smaller than the supply of labor, 1. When Condition (4) holds, the wage
rate will drop to 0. When it does not hold, we have excess demand for labor, which will give
us a positive wage rate in equilibrium. Thus we can write labor market clearing as
popl + 
hohl  1> (5)
where oml will be the labor demand of an individual l of group m> and (5) is satisfied with
equality when Condition (4) does not hold. Throughout the paper we analyze the results
both when Condition (4) holds and when it does not, because that will allow me to separate
the two sources of ine!ciency.15
2.2 Economic Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
An economic equilibrium is a set of intermediate and final good prices, s> sh> sp> wage
z> investment levels and employment levels for all producers {nm> om}m=h>p> such that given
a set of taxes,  h> p> and s> sh> sp> z> all producers choose investment and employment
optimally, good markets clear, and labor market clears=
The problem for the final good producers is given by,
Plq
|h>|p
sh|h + sp|p v=w=
|  " (|h) (|p)13 =
This minimization yields
|h
|p
=

1 
sp
sh
> (6)
Let us normalize s = (sh) (sp)13 = 1= Intermediate goods producers maximize profits
taking the price and wage rate as given, which can be written as
15This will become clearer when we analyze the political equilibrium.
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max
(1  m)
1 
sm
¡
nml
¢13 ¡oml ¢  zoml  nml > (7)
where m = h>p= As there is no initial or final stock of capital, we are basically assuming that
intermediate goods producers in each sector use units of final output to produce their goods.
This implies that the price of capital is one, as it can be seen in (7). This problem yields
nml =
¡
sm
¡
1  m
¢¢ 1
 oml (8)
oml =
;
A?
A=
= 0 if z A 
13 ((1 
m)sm)1@
5 [0> ] if z = 
13 ((1 
m)sm)1@
=  if z ? 
13 ((1 
m)sm)1@
(9)
Notice first in (9) that, whenever the marginal product of labor is smaller than the wage,
the producer does not hire any workers. When the marginal product is bigger than the wage
rate, a producer l of group m hires labor until reaching the maximum scale . It is also
worth discussing the source of ine!ciency in this economy. Looking at (8) we see that taxes
discourage investment. This is because producers are only able to recover a fraction of what
they invest.
We can replace (8) in (2) to find output for each individual of a group as a function of
their labor demand,
|ml =
1
1 
¡
sm
¡
1  m
¢¢ 13
 oml (10)
and, using (10) together with (8) > we can solve for the profits of each individual as a function
of the price of that sector and the wage rate,
ml =
µ

1 
¡
sm
¡
1  m
¢¢ 1
  z
¶
oml = (11)
For a given wage rate and employment, both output and profits will decrease with taxation
because investment decreases. It will be useful to combine (10) with (6) to solve for the
relative price of the two sectors (where recall that |m = m|ml )>
sh
sp
=
µ
1 p
1  h
¶13µ 
(1 )
popl
hohl
¶
= (12)
Most of the economic equilibrium has been already characterized. Because the impli-
cations for prices and wages of the model will dier, depending on whether there is full
employment or not, we will analyze these two cases separately in the next subsections. I first
analyze the equilibrium with excess labor supply and, in this case in which the wage rate
drops to 0, firms will always make positive profits. When I analyze the equilibrium when
9
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the labor market clears we will describe two types of equilibria. First, one in which nobody
makes profits because they do not reach the capacity constraint, and second, one in which
one of the groups reaches the capacity constraint and makes profits. Who makes the profits,
and when, will be a crucial question for the characterization of the political equilibrium.
2.2.1 The Economic Equilibrium with Excess Labor Supply
When Condition (4) holds, there is excess supply of labor in equilibrium and z = 0=
Equation (11) reveals that producers in both sectors always have positive profits, leading
them to hire the maximum amount of labor possible: oh = h and op = p= It is clear
then that taxes do not aect relative labor demands by each group. This is the main
dierence with the full employment case, and we will discuss the role it plays for the political
equilibrium in the following sections.
With relative labor demands constant, the only way taxes aect output and profits is
through investment and prices. Once we take into account the equilibrium levels of employ-
ment, (12) translates into
sh
sp
=
µ
1 p
1  h
¶13µ 
(1 )
p
h
¶
=
The interpretation of this relative price equation is straightforward. For given tax rates,
when the ratio of the middle class’ size relative to the size of the sector in which they produce,
p@(1)> is larger than the same ratio for the elite, the relative price of the good produced
by the elite increases. For given relative sizes, increased tax rates in the middle class sector
lead to smaller investment, which translates into lower production and a higher relative price
for that good.
We can combine (12) with the price normalization to solve for the price levels as
sh =
µ
1 p
1  h
¶(13)(13)µ 
(1 )
p
h
¶(13)
(13)
sp =
µ
1 p
1  h
¶3(13)µ 
(1 )
p
h
¶3
= (14)
The next proposition summarizes the economic equilibrium when there is excess supply
(proof in text):
Proposition 1 When Condition (4) holds, for given taxes  h and p> the economic equilib-
rium takes the following form: there is excess supply of labor, z = 0> and prices are given
10
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by (13) and (14) = Given prices and wage rates, investment, employment, and output in each
sector are given by (8) > (9) and (10) > respectively.
It is useful to derive profits for each group and total output in the economy for future
reference. Replace (13) and (14) in (10) > and then replace the resulting equation in (1) to
find total output in the economy as
| =
" (h) (p)13
1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@ = (15)
Again, it is clear that taxation in each sector reduces investment in that sector, which
translates into a reduction of total output. Profits for each group are derived by replacing
(13) and (14) into (11) > and taking into account that all producers reach the maximum scale,
h =
 (h) (p)13
1 
µ

1 
¶(13)
(1  h)1@
µ
(1 p)
(1  h)
¶(13)(13)@
(16)
p =
 (h) (p)13
1 
µ

1 
¶3 µ
(1  h)
(1 p)
¶(13)@
(1 p)1@= (17)
A number of points are worth mentioning. First, because the wage rate drops to 0, both
groups make profits. Second, as mentioned before, taxing a sector reduces profits of the
producers in that sector. Finally, for any of the groups, a tax in the other group’s sector
reduces their profits through its eect on the price. Taxing sector p makes the unit price of
the consumption good more expensive, which decreases the real value of profits for the elite.
As we have normalized the unit price to 1, this increase in the unit price translates into the
price of sector h going down.
2.2.2 The Economic Equilibrium with Labor Market Clearing
The main dierence in the case discussed in this section is that, as the labor market
clears, dierential tax rates across various sectors will aect the relative demand for labor
in those sectors. To make profits, producers need to reach their maximum scale. Thus,
the group that controls taxation -in this section the elite- can use taxes to modify relative
demands and make profits in equilibrium. The more they turn relative demand in their
favor, the less labor the other groups demand, which translates into lower factor prices and
higher profits for the elite.
When Condition (4) does not hold, we can have two types of equilibria: one in which
demand for goods produced by each group never exceeds what they can produce, and another
11
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in which one group reaches the maximum scale.16 The type of equilibrium we have will
depend, for given taxes, on the size of both groups. It will be important to understand when
any of the groups reach their maximum scale, because that is what determines profits and
what will determine taxation once we analyze the political equilibrium. For this reason, we
first characterize the equilibrium when none of the producers reach the maximum scale.
In this case, given that producers are price-takers, they make no profits in equilibrium,
which looking at (11) pins down price levels,
sm = z
µ
1 

¶
1
(1  m)
> (18)
and using this together with the price normalization we get the following expression for the
wage rate,
z =

1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢1@
= (19)
From (19) we see that the wage rate will depend on both tax rates. When the labor market
clears, because both sectors are not perfect substitutes for each other, labor demands for
each sector will depend on tax rates, and this feeds back into the wage rate. We can now
combine the relative price equation (12) with the price levels (18) and the wage rate (19) to
derive the equilibrium levels of employment in each sector, om = moml ,
oh =
1
1 + (13)(13
p)
(13h)
> op =
1
1 + (13
h)
(13)(13p)
= (20)
We can see from (20) how taxes distort the relative allocation of resources between sectors.
An increase in  h increases the relative price of good h, which decreases the relative demand
for that good. In equilibrium, less labor will be allocated to that sector (and consequently
less investment, as investment is proportional to labor), and more to sector p.
The equilibrium just derived holds as long as none of the groups reach their capacity
constraint on labor. In particular, for this to be an equilibrium we need the equilibrium
levels of employment to be smaller than the maximum scale for each group, oh  h and
op  p= Combining these conditions with (20) we can express them as
1 p
1  h


1 
1 h
h
 (> h) (21)
1 p
1  h


1 
p
1 p
 (> p) (22)
16Notice that because Condition (4) does not hold, we can never have both groups reaching the maximum
scale at the same time.
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where (> h) ? (> p) because Condition (4) does not hold. Notice that without taxation
in this model the equilibrium level of employment in sectors h and p would be  and (1)
respectively. As long as h   and p  (1  )> none of the groups would reach the
maximum scale. With taxation, we have to take into account the distortion that taxation
introduces in the allocation of resources across sectors. Equation (21) states that for the elite
not to reach the maximum capacity, the equilibrium level of employment in sector h once
we take into account the eect of taxation, has to be smaller than that capacity constrain.
In other words, relative taxation has to more than compensate for the small capacity of the
elite without taxation (@h). The second condition states the same for the middle class.
Whenever (21) does not hold and (22) holds, the elite producers hit the capacity con-
straint and thus they make profits in equilibrium. When (22) does not hold and (21) is
satisfied, the opposite occurs. Notice that (> m) is just a measure of the size of the group
relative to the size of the sector where they produce. If (> h) A 1> that means that the
elite producers are small relative to the size of their sector, and without taxation they would
be constrained and make profits. If (> h) ? 1> they would not make profits unless taxation
more than compensates for them being larger than the the sector in which they produce.
We can summarize this result in the following Lemma (proof in text):
Lemma 1 Assume Condition (4) does not hold. For given (> h) and (> p)> where
(> h) ? (> p) are defined in (21) and (22) > if (> h) ? (1p)@(1 h) ? (> p)> we
have an equilibrium where no group reaches the maximum scale. Whenever (1p)@(1 h) ?
(> h)> then the elite producers are capacity constrained and make profits in equilibrium,
and the middle class producers do not, as they do not reach the maximum scale. Finally,
when (> p) ? (1 p)@(1  h)> the middle class producers are capacity constrained and
make profits in equilibrium, while the elite do not.
We proceed now to analyze the determination of prices and wages when a group reaches
its maximum scale. To avoid repetition because of the symmetric structure, let us analyze
the case in which the elite producers are constrained, and summarize the results for the other
case at the end of this section.
If Condition (4) does not hold, then for the labor market to clear it has to be the case
that
z = min
m


1 
¡
(1  m)sm
¢1@¸ = (23)
The reason is that if both producers are making profits, total labor demand would be h+
p A 1> and we would have excess demand for labor which pushes the wage level up, until
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one of the groups is making no profits in equilibrium. Equation (23) automatically pins
down the price level for the producer with no profits. Denote as sm0 the price of the good in
the sector where producers make no profits. Then
sm0 =
µ
z
1 

¶
1
1  m0
= (24)
Equation (24) determines the price in sector p>
sp = z
µ
1 

¶
1
(1 p)
= (25)
The elite producers, because marginal product of labor is above the wage rate, hire as much
labor as they can, which leaves the rest of the labor force for the middle class to produce
in sector p> oh = h and op = 1  oh = 1  h. We can combine this together with the
expression for the relative price, (12) > and the price level in sector p> (25) > to solve for the
price of sector h as
sh =
µ
(> h)
(1  h)
(1 p)
¶
z
µ
1 

¶
1
(1  h)
= (26)
The equilibrium wage rate can be found again by combining (25) > (26) > and the price
normalization >
z =

1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢1@µ
(> h)
(1  h)
(1 p)
¶3
(27)
Whenever the middle class producers are constrained and the elite producers are not, we
are going to have oh = 1 p and op = p> and the derivation of the prices and the wage
rate is symmetrical to the case just analyzed. The solution is given by
sh = z
µ
1 

¶
sp =
µ
1 p
1  h
1
(> p)
¶
z
µ
1 

¶
1
(1 p)
(28)
z =

1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢1@µ(> p) (1  h)
(1 p)
¶13
We can see how the general equilibrium makes the price in a sector depend on the tax in the
other sector. When none of the groups reach the maximum scale, the eect is only through
labor market clearance, as described before. When a group is constrained, any taxation in
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the other group also feeds back into the price through another channel; a tax in the other
group increases the constrained group’s relative demand and because they are constrained,
quantity does not adjust. So for the intermediate goods market to clear the price of their
good has to increase. We are ready now to summarize the results in Proposition 2 (proof in
text):
Proposition 2 For given taxes  h and p> when Condition (4) does not hold, the economic
equilibrium takes the following form: For (> h) ? (1  p)@(1   h) ? (> p) none of
the groups are constrained by the maximum scale and the wage rate and prices are given by
(19) and (18) = For (> h) ? (1p)@(1 h)> the elite producers reach the maximum scale,
and the wage rate and prices are given by (25) (26) and (27) = Finally for (1p)@(1 h) A
(> p)> the middle class producers reach the capacity constraint, and the wage rate and
prices are given by (28) = Given prices and wage rates, investment employment and output
in each sector are given by (8) > (9) and (10) =
Again, it will be useful to derive total output and profits for each group for future
reference. Proceeding as before we have
| =
"
¡
h
¢
(1 h)13
1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@
for
(1 p)
(1  h)
? (> h) (29)
| =
1
1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢1@
(1  h) + (1 p)(1 )
for (> h) ?
(1 p)
(1  h)
? (> p) (30)
| =
"(1 p) (p)13
1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)13
¢(13)@
for (> p) ?
(1 p)
(1  h)
The elite producers only make profits whenever they reach the maximum scale, so profits
are
h =
h
(> h)

1 
[(> h)(1  h) (1 p)]× (31)
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@
for
(1 p)
(1  h)
? (> h)
In this section we have characterized the economic equilibrium. With excess labor supply,
both groups make profits in equilibrium, but when the labor market clears the relative
taxation on both sectors will determine who makes the profits. This immediately implies
that groups with political power, by setting relative taxation, will be able to manipulate the
relative allocation of resources in order to increase their profits. This will be important when
discussing the political equilibrium.
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2.3 Political Equilibrium under the Dictatorship of the Elite
I will now characterize the political equilibrium of this economy. I assume that political
institutions correspond to a dictatorship of the elite, and the elite producers can choose those
policies that benefit them the most. The only variables of choice for the government are the
tax rates. As discussed previously, this can be interpreted in a broader sense. We may think
of taxes also as expropriation, corruption, or other ine!cient policies that translate into less
investment and/or higher prices. Taxation is distortionary and there are no other means (in
particular, no lump-sum taxes) to extract resources from the other producers. The existence
of these policies does not imply that the elite will, necessarily, take advantage of them. But,
in our model, the elite will want to tax other producers for two reasons: first, they may
tax the middle class to extract revenues from them (Revenue Extraction), which is a direct
benefit from taxation. Second, they may seek to benefit through an indirect channel: by
taxing other groups with production activities, they reduce the demand for factors of these
groups and benefit themselves through lower factor prices and higher profits (Factor Price
Manipulation).
A political equilibrium is a set of policies { h> p> Wz> Wp> W h} that satisfies the budget
constraint for the government, (3) > and maximizes the elite’s utility. Given the linear pref-
erences, this translates into maximizing total income, where income of the elite is defined as
the sum of profits and the transfer,
Lh = h + W h> (32)
It is straightforward to see that the elite will redistribute all of the revenues from taxation
to themselves, so Wz = Wp = 0= Using this together with the government budget constraint,
(3) > the problem for the elite reduces to
Pd{
h>p
!( hsh|h + psp|p) + h
and combining this with the relative demands, (6) > it translates into
Pd{
h>p
!|( h + (1 )p) + h= (33)
To make the analysis as clear as possible and to emphasize the dierent sources of ine!ciency,
I analyze each of these sources separately by restricting the set of parameters.17
17The general case with both forces at play at the same time does not provide more insights than those
in here and it complicates the analysis.
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2.4 Revenue Extraction
In this section, let us assume there is excess labor supply; i.e., Condition (4) holds.
With this assumption, we remove Factor Price Manipulation as a possible source of taxation-
induced ine!ciency. Wages are now 0 and unaected by taxation, so the elite rulers do not
have an incentive to tax to increase profits. But this by itself will not remove all the eect of
taxation on profits, as profits will depend on both levels of taxation through the price levels
and the general equilibrium. Assume also that ! A 0 : the elite has enough state capacity to
redistribute taxation to themselves.
We can combine equations (33) > (15) > and (16) to write the elite’s problem as
Pd{
p>h
" (h) (p)13
1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@
×
(! ( h + (1 )p) + (1  h)) =
The solution to this problem (see the appendix for the details) is
 hUH = 0
pUH = Pd{

0>
 (! (1 ))
!(1 (1 ))
¸
>
where UH stands for Revenue Extraction. This is straightforward to interpret. The elite
producers never want to tax themselves. Taxing themselves has two opposite eects. First,
the only benefit is that elite producers get all the revenues from taxation. But this increases
the price of the goods they produce, and it reduces their profits. Without considering
profits, the elite would want to tax themselves, as they get all the revenue and they only
suer part of the price increase (they only consume a fraction of what they produce). But the
additional eect of a reduction in profits dominates and, therefore, they never tax themselves
in equilibrium.
Notice the impact of taxing the middle class on the elite’s profits through the general
equilibrium eect. Taxing the middle class makes their goods more expensive, which reduces
the real value of the elite’s profits. When the elite’s motivation to tax comes from Revenue
Extraction they would like to set a tax rate on the middle class that places them at the
peak of the Laer Curve, p = . But this must be weighed against the commensurate
reduction in the elite’s profits through the general equilibrium. Only when the Resource
Extraction motive for taxing is strong enough to compensate for the general equilibrium
eect will we have pUH A 0= Thus, the general equilibrium limits the extent to which the
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elite can expropriate the middle class.
Also, notice that taxation in the middle class sector increases as ! increases, and in
particular, when the Resource Extraction motive has its biggest importance, ! = 1> pHV = =
Larger state capacity helps overcome the general equilibrium eect, and when state capacity
is at its maximum level, the elite are able to set their most desired tax rate. Taxation is
also increasing with = The larger  is, the less distortion taxation creates, which leads to a
bigger tax rate. Additionally, the larger the size of the sector where the elite produce, > the
smaller taxation on the middle class sector is. This is because a larger  makes profits more
important as a source of income for the elite, exacerbating the general equilibrium eect.
The following Proposition summarizes these findings,
Proposition 3 When Condition (4) holds and ! A 0, the unique political equilibrium fea-
tures  hUH = 0 and pUH = Pd{
h
0> (!3(13d))!(13(13))
i
and the equilibrium tax rate for sector p
increases with  and !> and decreases with =
Proof. See Appendix
2.5 Factor Price Manipulation
So far, we have analyzed the political equilibrium when the only source of ine!ciency
was Revenue Extraction. Let us develop the opposite scenario. In this section we assume
that ! = 0= Remember, ! reflects the ability of the elite to collect and redistribute taxes.
When ! = 0> everything that is collected is lost: the elite receive no direct benefit from
taxation. Their only profit, then, comes from production activities. The elite thus need to
be reaching their maximum scale in the production of good h. From Proposition 1 we know
that this is going to be the case as long as (1 p)@(1  h) ? (> h)=
When the elite producers are capacity constrained, profits are going to be given by (31).
In this case it is clear that the elite will never tax themselves, as taxing themselves has only
the negative eect on profits, directly and through the wage rate. The problem for the elite
can then be written as
Pd{
p
h
(> h)

1 
[(> h) (1 p)] (1 p)(13)(13)@
v=w= (1 p) ? (> h)=
Notice first that the profit margin now depends on the tax rate on the middle class. The
reason is that in this type of equilibrium, demand for labor in sector h (and supply of good
h) is totally inelastic because the elite producers are reaching their capacity constraint. Any
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decrease in (1  p)> which leads to an increase in relative demand of good h> translates
into an increase in the price of good h. From this point of view, the elite would want to tax
sector p as much as possible. But the general equilibrium eect will stop them from doing
so. The restriction just captures the fact that the elites need to be in the region where they
have positive profits to have income.
The I=R=F= of this problem is

(1 )(1 )

h
(1 p)
+
h
[(> h) (1 p)]
= 0>
and we can rewrite this as
(1 p) = (> h)
(1 )(1 )
+ (1 )(1 )
We will have positive taxation as long as (> h) ? ((1  )(1  ) + )@(1  )(1  ) :
if the size of the elite relative to the size of the sector where they produce is small ((> h)
large), the elite producers will make profits even without taxation. There is no need for
the elite to tax the middle class, and they will choose not to do so because taxing reduces
profits through the general equilibrium eect. For the elite to tax the middle class, the elite
producers have to be large enough relative to the size of the sector where they produce.
When this is the case, p depends positively both on  and h. A big h means that
the elite will have excess capacity without taxation. The bigger h is> the higher is the
required tax on the middle class for the elite to make profits. A higher  implies that the
distortion in investment is going to have a small eect because the weight of capital in the
production of goods is small, which allows the elite to set higher taxes. Finally, the eect of
 is also negative. An increase in  decreases the weight of sector p in the price level and
consequently in the wage rate. Distorting sp is going to have a smaller eect in the wage rate
in equilibrium which tends to increase the desired tax rate on the middle class. Increasing
> however, reduces the necessity of taxing in order to make profits through (> h)> and
this eect dominates the first one. We summarize the results in the next Proposition (proof
in text):
Proposition 4 When Condition (4) does not hold and ! = 0, the unique political equilibrium
features  hISP = 0 and pISP = Pd{
h
0> 1 (> h) (13)(13)+(13)(13)
i
and the equilibrium tax
rate for sector p increases with  and h and decreases with =
Again we see how the general equilibrium eect works as a limit on the extent to which
the elite can expropriate the middle class. Without it, the elite would want to tax as much
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as possible. And notice that without tax revenues there is no Laer Curve. Without general
equilibrium eect the elite would want to fully expropriate the middle class. But because
the real value of their profits decreases with taxation in the other sector, they will only tax
whenever it is strictly necessary; that is, when they have excess capacity.
Which source of ine!ciency, Revenue Extraction or Factor Price Manipulation, leads to
higher taxes depends on the size of the elite as a group. When the source of ine!ciency is
Revenue Extraction, the tax rate is the same no matter what the size of the elite is. For Factor
Price Manipulation, Proposition 4 states that the tax rate increases with the size of the elite.
In particular, notice that when h =  ((> h) = 1)> pISP = @( + (1  )(1  )) A
  pUH= Also, we discussed earlier that for 
h ??  ((> h) AA 1)> pISP = 0  pUH=
Thus Factor Price Manipulation will generate higher taxation when the elite producers are
big as a group because they would have excess capacity without taxation, and the bigger the
excess capacity they have, the more they need to tax to distort demands in order to make
profits.
The key for the results in the political equilibrium is that the elite producers not only set
policies but also take part in production activities, which allow them to make profits. Because
they make profits, they want to tax the middle class more than themselves. But taxing
asymmetrically distorts the allocation of resources across sectors and, as a consequence,
taxing the middle class not only reduces total tax revenues (the Laer Curve eect) but also
reduces the elite’s profits as the relative price of their goods decreases fast with taxation.
This restrains the elite from taxing the middle class too much.
3 Opening the Economy to International Trade
This section modifies the previous framework by allowing international trade in inter-
mediate goods. The main result will be that, as trade removes the general equilibrium
eect that distorting the relative price has on the elite’s profits, expropriation/taxation will
increase with increased trade integration.
I assume a small open economy that has access to world markets for goodsp and h= These
goods sell at prices shW and spW> and are produced with the same technologies in the rest of
the world. We assume the forces relevant in the small open economy do not apply for the rest
of the world: with both sectors using the same technology and no scarce “factors” it is clear
that both intermediate goods will sell at the same price in world markets. And because we
have normalized the unit price for the consumption bundle to one, this immediately implies
that the price for both intermediate goods will be one and employment in each sector will
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be  and 1 .18
It will be useful to discuss the source for gains derived from trade in the context of this
model without expropriation. If one group of producers is small relative to the size of the
other, the goods they produce are very expensive in the closed economy: the relative price
for that good is greater than one, and opening to trade will allow others to buy those goods
at lower prices. Benefits from trade for this economy derive from the relative scarcity of
the groups, or, in other words, the relative abundance of a group in our economy provides
them with comparative advantage in the production of that good. This is a simplification,
as we could think of the size of both groups as incorporating dierences in productivity as
well, and then talk about comparative advantage in terms of eective endowments of social
groups.19
Let us proceed by first solving for the economic equilibrium for a given set of policies,
and then move on to characterizing the political equilibrium.
3.1 Economic Equilibrium with Trade
Most of the derivations from Section 2 are valid in this Section; to avoid repetition, we
will simply emphasize what is new. For clarity of exposition, I will derive the equilibrium
for shW and spW and simply replace them with one whenever is needed to discuss results.
When Condition (4) holds we have an excess supply of labor at home and wages will
again drop to 0, which means that for any price level in the world market and any domestic
tax level both groups produce and make profits. Given that the wage rate drops to 0 all
producers hire labor until reaching the maximum scale. Replacing the price levels in (10) >
the levels of output in each sector are
|h =
1
1 
(shW (1  h))
13
 h (34)
|p =
1
1 
(spW (1 p))
13
 p= (35)
where we already have replaced for the employment levels. Notice that output in sector m
only depends on taxation in sector m= This is the result of two things. First, excess supply of
labor removes any eect of taxation on the wage rate. Second, because prices are set outside
the domestic economy, relative taxation does not aect relative prices.
18By normalizing the relative price of intermediate sectors to 1 for the rest of the world I abstract from any
source of comparative advantage, other that the dierence on tax rates. This allows for a cleaner discussion
of the main result of the paper.
19This assumption implies that the elites will only control the exporting sector if they are a large group.
This may seem counterfactual in some historical cases, but it is just the consequence of assuming no pro-
ductivity dierences across groups and it does not aect the analysis.
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For future reference and proceeding as in the closed economy, total profits for each group
are
h =
µ

1 
(shW (1  h))
1

¶
h (36)
p =
µ

1 
(spW (1 p))
1

¶
p> (37)
where again, profits in sector m only depend on taxation in sector m=
If Condition (4) does not hold, it will still be the case that prices will not depend on
taxation, but wages will. In particular for given prices and taxes, the wage rate has to clear
the labor market, and will be given by (23) = If we denote with m0 the group with the minimum
(1  m)sWm> that is, the group with no profits in equilibrium, the economic equilibrium with
trade is as follows: the other group, m> has profits in equilibrium and reaches the maximum
scale, om = m, while group m0 hires the rest of the labor, om0 = 1 m> so levels of output in
each sector are
|m =
1
1 
¡
smW
¡
1  m
¢¢ 13
 m (38)
|m
0
=
1
1 
³
sm
0W
³
1  m
0
´´ 13

(1 m)= (39)
and total profits for each group are
m =
µ

1 
¡
smW
¡
1  m
¢¢ 1
  z
¶
m
m0 = 0 (40)
Let us describe the pattern of export/imports in this model. Total domestic consumption
of each intermediate good is given by
shWfh = (shW|h + spW|p) (41)
spWfp = (1 )(shW|h + spW|p> (42)
where we use fm to dierentiate aggregate consumption of good m from aggregate production
of that good. A country is a net exporter of good m if smWfm ? smW|m> which implies that the
domestic economy is a net exporter of good h (importer of goodp) if (1)shW|h A spW|p.
22
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In the case of excess labor supply this translates into
shW
spW
A
µ
1 p
1  h
¶13µ 
(1 )
p
h
¶
>
and, with full employment and assuming that the elite producers are the ones with profits
(which will be the case in equilibrium), this translates into
shW
spW
A
µ
1 p
1  h
¶13µ 
(1 )
1 h
h
¶
=
Notice that in both cases the right-hand side of the equation corresponds to a measure
of relative employment in each sector adjusted by the distortions that taxation creates on
relative productivity. If the middle class is larger relative to the size of their sector compared
with the elite (and adjusted by relative taxation), the country has a comparative advantage
in the production of that good and consequently it will be a net exporter of that good. If
we did not have either taxation or capacity constraints in this model, the relative price of
the two sectors in equilibrium would be one because both sectors use the same technology.
But because there are capacity constraints, the size of the groups determines comparative
advantage. The next Proposition summarizes the results (proof in text):
Proposition 5 For a small open economy, for given taxes  h and p> and world prices for
intermediate goods, shW and spW> the economic equilibrium takes the following form: When
Condition (4) holds, there is excess supply of labor and wages drop to 0. When Condition
(4) does not hold, the wage rate is given by (23) = Given prices and wage rates, investment
employment and output in each sector are given by (8) > (9) and (10) =
Notice that an increase in the taxation on the middle class will reduce their investment
and production but it will not aect the prices in the elite’s sector, and thus it will not aect
their production. Now that the country has access to these goods in foreign markets, taxation
policy will not aect the real value of the elite’s profits. The distortion will aect exports
and imports: first, production by the middle class decreases, and second, consumption in
the domestic economy decreases as a consequence of the decrease in total income. If the elite
are exporting their good, they can compensate for the decrease in the middle class’ demand
by exporting more abroad and importing more of the other goods. If the economy is a net
importer for the elite’s good, an increase in taxation on the middle class will induce fewer
exports of good p and less imports of good h=
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3.2 Political Equilibrium with Trade
We have seen how the general equilibrium eect was limiting the elite from taking full
advantage from taxation on the middle class sector. When the economy is open to trade this
will not necessarily be the case. As discussed in the Introduction, the key dierence between
a closed and an open economy is that, in the latter, taxation in both sectors is no longer
linked through the general equilibrium (other than through the wage rate). Prices in one
sector do not depend on taxation in the other. This observation drives the principal finding
of this paper: trade increases the ine!ciency of political institutions with limited checks on
the executive power because it removes the general equilibrium eects that prevent the elite
from extracting too much rents in a closed economy.
We proceed now to describe the political equilibrium as in the closed economy, by ana-
lyzing each source of ine!ciency separately.
3.2.1 Revenue Extraction
Proceeding as before, assume that Condition (4) holds so that we isolate the Revenue
Extraction source of ine!ciency. Assume also that ! A 0= The elite’s problem is now
Pd{
p>h
!
 h
1 
(shW)
1
 (1  h)
13
 h +
µ

1 
(shW (1  h))
1

¶
h+
!
p
1 
(spW)
1
 (1 p)
13
 p=
This returns to the main point. The elite’s profits no longer depend on taxation in sector p,
because opening to trade removes the general equilibrium eect. The first order condition
with respect to  h is always negative: the elite producers never want to tax themselves.
Given that the solution to this problem is straightforward, income of the elite is maximized
when pUH>W =  where W stands for trade. The elite tax the middle class at the peak of
the Laer Curve, because taxing sector p does not aect the value of their profits. In the
closed economy, this was not the case. The elite could not tax the middle class too much
because good p was produced exclusively by the middle class, and excessive taxation meant
increasing the price of the consumption good, which meant a reduction in the real value of
the elite’s profits. With trade, taxation aects trade volumes instead of relative prices, since
the domestic economy now can find those goods in the world’s markets. Opening to trade
increases ine!ciency by increasing substitutability between the elite’s and the middle class’
sectors.
The only case in which this is not true is when the rulers have maximum state capacity;
i.e., ! = 1= In the closed economy, the elite behaves as if there was no general equilibrium
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eect when ! = 1, because the gains of taxing at the peak of the Laer Curve more than
outweigh the losses of the general equilibrium eect. The following Proposition summarizes
this result (proof in text):
Proposition 6 For a small open economy, given world prices for intermediate goods, shW
and spW> the unique political equilibrium when the source of ine!ciency is Revenue Extraction
features pUH>W = = Trade weakly increases taxation/ine!ciency.20
3.2.2 Factor Price Manipulation
Assume now that there is no Revenue Extraction motive for taxation, ! = 0 and Con-
dition (4) does not hold. Then the elite producers only care about profits and their problem
becomes
Pd{
p
h =
µ

1 
shW
1
 (1  h)
13
  z
¶
h>
with the wage rate defined as in (23) = Notice from the wage equation (23) that the elite will
only make profits if (shW (1  h))
1
 ? (spW (1 p))
1
 . In other words, the elite has to tax
middle class enough to make the value of their labor productivity greater than that of the
middle class. If the elite tax themselves, it becomes harder for them to make profits and
it reduces profits when they have them. So, they forego doing so. The elite will tax the
middle class in order to reduce the middle class’ labor productivity to less than their own.
But now there is no general equilibrium eect stopping the elite from pushing taxation even
higher. So, it is clear that in this case the elite is going to tax the middle class as much as
they can, dropping the wage rate to 0, pISP>W = 1=21 Again, opening to trade exacerbates
policy ine!ciencies by removing the moderating power of the general equilibrium eect. The
results for the political equilibrium are summarized in this Proposition (proof in text):
Proposition 7 For a small open economy, given world prices for intermediate goods, shW
and spW> the unique political equilibrium when the source of ine!ciency is Factor Price
Manipulation features pISP>W = 1. Trade increases taxation/ine!ciency
The intuition behind this increased ine!ciency is the same than before: access to foreign
markets allows the elite to find what the middle class produces somewhere else. Because
of this, taxing the middle class does not aect the real value of the elite’s profits and they
are free to extract as much rent as they desire. With trade, ine!ciency increases through
20“Weakly” just reflects that in the case with ! = 1 ine!ciency does not change.
21Taxing the middle class at the highest rate is highly ine!cient, and this result comes directly from
assuming ! = 0= As long as ! A 0> since labor demand will shift from one sector to the other, the tax rate
on the middle class will never go to 1.
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an increase in expropriation and the distortions that this increased expropriation creates on
investment.
That the eects of taxation on prices disappear with trade is specific to the small open
economy case. But the main result would remain consistent. Trade increases competition
and, through that, it increases the substitutability between domestic sectors, which increases
the incentives of the group in power to extract rents from other groups.22
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I analyze the winners and losers in this process of trade integration. The
results will be a balance between two eects. First, as shown in Propositions 6 and 7, trade
increases expropriation and this will benefit the group in power, while damaging everyone
else. Second, trade benefits the group that is relatively abundant in the economy, as it
increases the price of that good with respect to the closed economy. I will characterize when
it is the case that one eect dominates the other for each group. Finally, for the country
to win with trade, winners have to win more than losers lose; in this context, due to the
increased expropriation after trade, this is not necessarily the case. The conditions for when
this is the case will be derived in this section.
For the rest of the paper, let us replace shW = spW = 1= Comparing welfare will be reduced
to comparing income levels, because preferences are linear. Total income in the economy is
given by
Z = z + h + p + W h>
that is, total profits for each group, transfers, and the wage from the workers. Let me again
proceed by separating the analysis in two parts, one for each source of ine!ciency.23
4.1 Revenue Extraction
The first thing to point out is that when Revenue Extraction is the only source of
ine!ciency workers will not be aected by trade opening, as in both cases wages will be 0.
22As discussed in the introduction, the result that trade increases ine!ciency through the increase in
expropriation is true as long as there is certain complementarity between what the elites and the middle
class produce. In the paper this is captured by assuming an elasticity of one (Cobb-Douglas technology
for the final good). If I was to allow for a more general case, the result would be stronger the smaller
the elasticity of substitution between those two sectors. Of course, if both sectors were perfect substitutes,
opening to trade would have no eect on expropriation.
23It is important to point out that trade liberalization is exogenous. If I was to endogenize the decision
to liberalize, the elites would only do so when they benefited from it. And in most of those cases, as
discussed below, they would do so at the expense of the economy, that is, welfare would decrease with trade
liberalization.
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Total welfare before and after trade is then
ZUH = hUH + !
p
UHs
p
UH|
p
UH + 
p
UH
ZUH>W = hUH>W + !
p
UH>Ws
Wp
UH>W|
p
UH>W + 
p
UH>W >
where the first two terms are profits and taxation that go to the elite and the third term are
profits of the middle class. Let me look first at what would happen in this model without
taxation. Both the middle class and the elite make profits before and after trade. Who wins
and who loses with trade depends on whose profits go up. Taking the expression for profits
and eliminating taxation from them we see that the elite producers win with trade ifµ
p
h
¶
?

1 
>
and the middle class wins if this condition does not hold,µ
p
h
¶
A

1 
This is straightforward to interpret. Before trade prices are determined by relative abundance
of each group, so the group that is more abundant has smaller profits. Opening to trade
implies that the price for the abundant group goes up while the price for the scarce group
goes down.
Let us look now at what happens in our model once we incorporate taxation. Proposition
8 summarizes the results.
Proposition 8 When Revenue Extraction is the source of ine!ciency and the economy
opens to trade, workers are unaected. The middle class wins with trade whenever
¡p
h
¢
A³dp
h
´
> where
³dp
h
´
A 
13 is defined in (43) (Appendix)= The elite producers win with trade
whenever 
p
h ?
p
h#$
> and ph A
#$
p
h > where

13 ?
p
h#$
?
#$
p
h are defined in (44) (Appendix)=
Welfare decreases in the whole economy when opening to trade whenever 
p
h 5
³
p
h >
p
h
´
>
where 
p
h and
p
h are defined in (46) =
Proof. See Appendix
Let us interpret this proposition. The first statement says that the middle class producers
only benefit with trade only when they are large enough relative to the size of the elite. And
this is again capturing comparative advantage: when the middle class are large their prices
are really low in the closed economy. Opening to trade increases the price of the good
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trade. Second, the middle class will remain unaected by trade opening: they make no profit
in either case 24 Thus, whether the economy wins or loses with trade will depend on whether
the elite producers win enough to outweigh the welfare loss of the workers. Proposition 9
summarizes the results:
Proposition 9 When Factor Price manipulation is the source of ine!ciency and the econ-
omy opens to trade, workers always lose. The middle class is unaected, having no profits
either before or after trade. For the elite producers, if (50) (Appendix) holds they win with
trade whenever h A hISP > where 
h
ISP ?  is defined in (49) (Appendix)= Whenever
(50) does not hold, elite producers win with trade when h A hISP > with 
h
ISP A 
defined in (51) (Appendix)= Welfare decreases in the whole economy when opening to trade
whenever h ? hISP > where 
h
ISP A  is defined in (48) (Appendix)=
Let us discuss the intuition behind these results. Why do the elite producers lose with
trade when they are a small group? In this model, comparative advantage with the rest of
the world is determined by the relative size of each group. When the elite producers are
small, that means that in the closed economy the prices of the goods they produce are very
high because they are the scarce “factor”. On the other hand, trade allows the elite rulers
to tax the middle class more heavily, dropping the wage rate to 0. Which eect dominates
will depend on how small the elite producers are, the smaller the group the bigger the drop
in prices, which might more than outweigh the decrease in the wage rate. Notice that, as
in the previous section, the elite benefit from trade for a bigger range of parameters than
without expropriation.
Also, because the only group that ever wins with trade is the elite producers (whenever
they do), for trade to be welfare enhancing it must be the case that the economy is almost
only composed of this elite. The country only wins with trade if the elite is a very large part
of society.
By adding expropriation, we go from a situation where the economy always wins with
trade and the elite either loses or stays the same, to another situation in which the economy
loses with trade unless the elite producers are a very big group, and the elite producers win
unless they are a very small group. This is the heart of the problem: political institutions
allow the elite producers to choose the policies that benefit them the most, without consid-
ering their repercussions on other groups of society. And they manage to benefit from trade
at the expense of these other groups.
24In the closed economy the elite producers always tax the middle class to shift relative demand until they
make profits. The only case when they do not tax the middle class is when (> h) A 1= Lemma 1 shows
that the middle class producers do not make profits either in this case.
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they produce and benefits them. But notice that the condition now is more restrictive than
before,
³dp
h
´
A 
13 = And this is reflecting the fact that trade increases expropriation. For
the middle class producers to win with trade, their relative size has to be large enough to
outweigh the increase in expropriation too.
For the elite the analysis is similar. Because they benefit from the increase in expropria-
tion their relative size does not have to be as large for them to benefit with trade, 
p
h ?
p
h#$
>
where 
13 ?
p
h#$
= Notice that the elite producers also benefit with trade when they are small
enough, that is when 
p
h A
#$
p
h = The reason is that their income is composed of profits and
taxation. When the middle class is a very large group, most of the elite’s income comes from
tax revenues. Also, when the middle class producers are very large, their price goes up when
they open to trade. This benefits the elite too, and more than outweighs the decrease in the
elite’s profits.
Welfare increases with trade only if the elite producers are either very large or very small.
And this is simple to interpret. When the two groups are very similar, the relative price of
their goods is close to 1. This means that the gains from opening to trade are not that large.
In this case the increase in ine!ciency outweighs the gains from trade. We need the gains
from trade to be large enough for trade to be welfare enhancing. And this is the case when
the groups are very dierent in size.
4.2 Factor Price Manipulation
Whenever this is the case we have seen that only the elite producers make profits, both
with and without trade. Also, because state capacity is null, ! = 0> there is no direct benefit
from taxation, W h = 0= Total welfare before and after trade is then
ZISP = zISP + hISP
ZISP>W = hISP>W =
Let us discuss first what would happen in this model without taxation. As we have
already discussed, the economy as a whole would always win. What happens with the elite
and the middle class in such a model? Because prices would be equal in both sectors, neither
of the groups would make profits with trade: all the benefits would go to labor. Thus, the
elite producers would lose with trade whenever they had profits in the closed economy, that
is when  A h=
When we incorporate taxation two points are worth making. First, workers are strictly
worse o. Wages drop from a positive value in the closed economy all the way down to 0 with
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Finally, it is important to point out that the bigger losers in this context are the workers.
The middle class producers make no profit either before or after trade; they are equally
expropriated. But taxation on the middle class actually leaves the workers worse o through
its eect on wages: the elite producers manage to expropriate all labor income from them.
5 Political Equilibrium under Democracy
Let us now briefly discuss what happens when, instead of a dictatorship of the elite,
we have a democracy. A democracy is a set of political institutions that gives the right
to vote and thus take part in the policy-making process to the majority of the population.
In what follows I assume h + p ? 1= With this assumption political institutions that
give all the political power to the workers correspond to a democracy, as workers are the
majority. It could be argued that this is an ad-hoc assumption about the composition of
power in a democracy, that democracies do not necessarily represent the preferences of the
workers; in most of the developed world, for example, the majority is the middle class. At a
first approximation, however, when a country transitions from dictatorship to democracy, it
tends to be the case that most of its society is composed of workers. When one examines the
dictatorships in today’s less-developed economies, in most cases one finds that workers are
in the majority. Great levels of inequality, a small elite, and an almost non-existent middle
class characterize most economies with dictatorships, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
The main dierence between democracy and dictatorship for these purposes is that the
workers, participating as they do in all sectors of the economy, have preferences for ine!-
ciency that are in line with the economy as a whole. In other words: because workers are
hired in all sectors, and because they do not care about profits, they do not want to distort
resource allocation across sectors. Because they do not distort resource allocation across
sectors, it is not costly for them to set their desired tax rates in the closed economy on a
basis other than the standard Laer Curve. As a consequence, trade will not have an eect
on the taxes they set.
The following sections will characterize the political equilibrium of this democracy with
and without trade. Before doing that, let us note what happens when the source of ine!-
ciency is exclusively Factor Price manipulation, ! = 0= This is a very trivial case. Workers
never make profits and they are not able to benefit directly from taxation. Because any
taxation feeds directly into the wage rate and reduces it, both with and without trade, they
will never set a positive level of taxation in any of the groups. Therefore, when Factor Price
manipulation is the source of ine!ciency, a democracy is non-distortionary, and opening to
international trade is always welfare enhancing. Let us now analyze Revenue Extraction.
30
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0633 
 
5.1 Closed Economy
Because we assume that Condition (4) holds, wages drop to 0 and the only source of
income for workers are taxes. The problem for the workers becomes
Pd{
h>p
!|( h + (1 )p)>
with | given by (15) = After the analysis for the dictatorship it is straightforward to see that
the solution to this problem is
p>gUH = 
h>g
UH = >
where g stands for democracy.25 Workers tax both sectors symmetrically. This is intuitive,
given that workers do not care about profits. Taxing both sectors in the same amount does
not distort relative demands, thus minimizing the eect of the distortion in final output.
Notice that the general equilibrium eect is not stopping the workers from setting the desired
tax rates; this is precisely because workers themselves remove the general equilibrium eect
by setting equal tax rates.
5.2 Small Open Economy and Democracy
When we open the democracy to trade, the problem for the workers is given by
Pd{
h>p
!
p
1 
(1 p)
13
 p + !
 h
1 
(1  h)
13
 h>
where recall that wages are still 0 in the open economy, so income for the workers is solely
taxes. This is exactly the same problem as with the closed economy, replacing  and (1)
with h and p, which implies that the solution does not change,
p>gUH>W = 
h>g
UH>W = =
Taxation does not change with trade; this has the immediate implication that trade is welfare
improving for this economy as it will only be aected by the standard benefits of trade.
Proposition 10 Under a democracy, trade does not have any eect on the sources of inef-
ficiency and taxation does not change. Opening to trade is always welfare enhancing.
What is dierent between democracies and dictatorships that leads to such dierent
results? Democracies typically give more weight to workers in the decision-making process
25See appendix for the proof that symmetric taxation is always the solution where Revenue Extraction is
the sole source of ine!ciency.
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and workers participate in all sectors of the economy. This makes them reluctant to tax and
distort resource allocation across sectors, because any distortion feeds back into the wage
rate; this reticence leads in general to lower distortions. In addition, workers do not care
about profits. Because they do not care about profits, the general equilibrium effect that
stops the elite producers from setting their desired tax rates does not apply to them and
trade has no effect on workers’ preferences for inefficiency.
Finally it is important to notice that although in the Factor Price Manipulation case a
democracy is more efficient than a dictatorship in absolute terms, under Revenue Extraction
this may not be the case. In particular it can be shown that a democracy will give higher
welfare except for really low levels of state capacity, φ. The reason is that when this is the case,
dictatorships do not tax at all or tax at really low levels because the general equilibrium
effect hurts them too much.26 This result is just a consequence of assuming excess labor
supply. With labor market clearance workers would take into account the effect of taxation
in wages and democracies would always tend to be more efficient than dictatorships.27
6 Conclusions
This paper began by describing how less-developed economies with dictatorial regimes have
remained stagnant with respect to economic performance over the last four decades. At
the same time, those countries are much more integrated to the global economy than they
were 40 years ago. I claimed that these two facts are not independent of each other and
interpreted them as evidence that traditional trade theories cannot explain these experiences
because they lack an important ingredient: the efficiency of institutions.
I developed a simple model that endogenized the efficiency of institutions and argued
that part of the reason why poor nations may not have benefited as much from international
trade is because increased trade may lead to worse policies and economic institutions in
societies with weak political institutions: in a closed economy, groups with political power
are restrained in their rent extraction policies because of the general equilibrium price effects
that these will create. Increased international trade removes these price effects and may
increase the intensity of rent extraction, and with that increase inefficiency. The increase in
inefficiency may more than outweigh the standard gains from trade, and trade integration
can potentially make the whole economy worse off.28
Whether this is something relevant empirically is something to address in the future,
26And remember that workers tax both sectors always.
27See Acemoglu (2006) for a discussion of this.
28Because in my model preferences were linear, all th discussion about welfare applies to income levels.
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although as mentioned in the introduction, Segura-Cayuela (2006a) is a first effort to provide
evidence that the main result in the current paper is present on the data. I use a panel of
92 countries and 17 years to show that expropriation increases with trade opening for non-
democratic countries, while it is reduced for democratic ones.
This paper tries to caution about trade policy recommendations for less-developed economies
with weak political institutions and insufficient checks on the executive power. Policy rec-
ommendations should be about long run economic performance, not about trade. Rodrik
(1998), in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, argued that trade should not be the focus of
economic policy: the quick fix that trade may provide cannot substitute for the poor quality
of institutions. My paper goes even further by saying that trade may not even provide that
quick fix and it can actually deteriorate the quality of institutions.
External trade policy recommendations will have damaging effects, according to my
model. And this will be true even if these recommendations include measures to reduce
the state’s intrusion and liberalize markets. If incentives are not modified, governments in
these countries can easily find alternative ways of reaching its intrusive and rent extracting
objectives. As long as political institutions do not change, incentives to expropriate will be in
place and trade can potentially deteriorate the quality of institutions. The important ques-
tion that follows from this discussion is whether trade can help transition to better political
institutions.
Can trade change political institutions? This paper analyzes how trade affects preference
for inefficiency, but all the analysis assumes that, with the introduction of trade, political
power either does not change or changes in a direction that does not affect the results.
Nonetheless, the relationship between political power, economic performance, economic in-
stitutions, and political institutions is a non-trivial, dynamic one. There are two types of
political power: de jure and de facto. De jure political power is the power of the ruler as
derived from political institutions. De facto political power is the ability of other groups in
society to restrict de jure political power and exert their own through, for instance, violence
or protests. It is important to note that de facto power derives directly from the distribution
of resources. Thus, policies that affect the distribution of resources will indirectly affect
tomorrow’s allocation of power and with that the persistence and efficiency of political insti-
tutions.29 Because trade might change the distribution of resources today, it might affect the
allocation of power tomorrow, and with that it might affect the type of political institutions
a country develops. In other words, trade itself might affect whether a country is in the top
or bottom of Figure 2.
29See Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) for a discussion on the distinction between de jure and de facto
political power.
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An example of this is found in chapter 10 of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). In their
framework, democracies are costly for political elites because they imply redistribution to-
wards other social groups. To the extent that trade reduces inequality it also reduces redis-
tribution, which can make the political elite less reluctant to allow democratization. Also,
in an extension to my paper I am currently working on, I am analyzing how trade aects
political institutions. For instance, the fact that trade exacerbates expropriation does not
necessarily mean that trade makes a regime change less likely to occur. While trade can
have negative eects, it might still benefit some groups -other than the elite- through stan-
dard trade eects and it might increase the incentives to overthrow ine!cient regimes. First
non-elite groups are now more oppressed and this makes their situation less desirable; and
second, the benefits of being in power increase for non-elite groups for the same reason than
it increases for the elite minority. When does opening to trade evolve into a democracy?
When do we get a dictatorship of the middle class? All these questions are interesting areas
for future research, and questions that I am currently addressing on a companion paper.
Finally this paper has abstracted from factor mobility and the role of factor endowments.
It would be interesting to combine the forces at play in this model with the standard force
in the literature: capital mobility reduces expropriation in less-developed economy to avoid
capital leaving the economy. To address this question it is important to understand several
issues. First, who is the elite of a dictatorship and why? It is clear that dictatorships from
now and the past have diered on the type of elite they had. And even inside the same
dictatorship the elite modified over time. Second, what is the role of factor endowments in
all this? Do factor endowments have any role determining the type of elite? All these forces
are important if we want to understand how the mechanism in this model interacts with
capital mobility. My work in Segura Cayuela (2006b) is a first attempt to understand these
issues.
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7 Appendix A: Proofs
7.1 Proof of Proposition 3
We need to show that the elite producers never want to tax themselves. To do this, we split
the analysis in two. First, we need to show that there is no solution where the elite tax both
sectors. Then, we need to show that any solution where the elite only tax themselves gives
them less income than taxing only the middle class. The problem for the elite is
Pd{
p>h
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@

(! ( h + (1 )p) + (1  h)) =
The I=R=F=v are
( h)
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@
"

 (13)
(1  h)
(! ( h + (1 )p) + (1  h)) + (! )
#
= 0
(p)
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@ "

(1 ) (13)
(1 p)
(! ( h + (1 )p) + (1  h)) + (1 )!
#
= 0
Notice that if ! ?  the IRF for  h is always negative , so the elite would set  h = 0=
Assume this is not the case. A solution with both tax rates positive requires, combining
both equations, that
(1 p) =
! 
!
(1  h) = (1  h)=
We can now replace this in the IRF for  h and after some algebra we get to
(1 )!+ (1  h)(! )>
And notice that even for  h = 0 this is negative. So there is no equilibrium where the elite
tax both sectors at the same time. If they tax just one sector the equilibrium rates in each
case are just found by solving each of the IRF assuming the other tax rate is 0. This gives
pW =Pd{

0>
 (! (1 d))
!(1 (1 ))
¸
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and
1  hW =Plq

1>
!
! 
(1 )
+ (1 )
¸
From this we derive that  h A 0 if ! A (+(1))> and p A 0 if ! A (1d)= So for ! 5
[(1 d)> (+ (1 ))] we know that the solution is given by p =Pd{
h
0> (!3(13d))!(13(13))
i
=
For ! 5 [(+ (1 ))> 1] we need to check which taxation gives the elite producers more
income. It is straightforward to check that
Ch
C h
¯¯¯¯
h=0>p=pW
 0>
Ch
Cp
¯¯¯¯
h=0>p=pW
= 0
Ch
C h
¯¯¯¯
h=hW>p=0
= 0>
Ch
Cp
¯¯¯¯
h=hW>p=0
A 0>
for ! 5 [(+ (1 ))> 1] > which immediately implies that  h =  hW and p = 0 is not a
solution. This concludes the proof.
7.2 Proof that Symmetric Taxation is the Solution with a Democ-
racy in a Closed Economy
The problem for the workers is
Pd{
h>p
!
" (h) (p)13
1 
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@
( h + (1 )p)=
The I=R=F=v are
( h)
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@
 "

 (13)
(1  h)
( h + (1 )p) + 
#
= 0
(p)
¡
(1  h)(1 p)(13)
¢(13)@ "

(1 ) (13)
(1 p)
( h + (1 )p) + 1 
#
= 0=
The solution with both tax rates positive is given by,
 h = p = =
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If they only tax one sector it is easy to check that
Ch
C h
¯¯¯¯
h=0>p=pW
A 0>
Ch
Cp
¯¯¯¯
h=0>p=pW
= 0
Ch
C h
¯¯¯¯
h=hW>p=0
= 0>
Ch
Cp
¯¯¯¯
h=hW>p=0
A 0>
i.e. taxing just one sector is not a solution. This completes the proof.
7.3 Proofs for Welfare Analysis with Revenue Extraction
7.3.1 Individual Groups
Let us look at what happens with the middle class once we incorporate taxation. The
middle class is better o with trade if pUH>W A pUH> which looking at equations (17) and
(37) translates into
(1 pUH)
(13(13))@¡
1 pUH>W
¢1@ µ1  hp
¶
? 1>
or µ
p
h
¶
A
µ
1 

¶
(1 pUH)
(13(13))@
(1 )1@
=
Ãdp
h
!
> (43)
where notice that
³dp
h
´
A
³
13

´
because pUH ?  and 1 (1 ) ? 1=
For the elite the analysis is much more cumbersome. I want to prove that they benefit
for
¡p
h
¢ ? ³13 ´ $> for some $ A 1 and that they also benefit even when ¡ph ¢ is very
large. In other words I want to proof that there is an intermediate range of 
p
h in which the
elite is worse o. Income for the elite is higher with trade if
h + p (1 )(13)@ ! A
" (1 pUH)
(13(13))@ (h) (p)13 [ + !(1 )pUH] >
and rearranging terms this translates intoµ
p
h
¶13

µ
1 

¶13

1 + 
p
h ! (1 )
(13)@d
(1 pUH)
(13)(13)@d ( + 
p
UH
 !(1 ))
= (44)
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where pUH is defined as in Proposition 3. Allow me to define
 
! (1 )(13)@d
(1 pUH)
(13)(13)@d ( + 
p
UH
 !(1 ))
=
Notice two things. First, the right hand side (RHS) of equation (44) is linear ( and
increasing) in 
p
h while the LHS is concave and increasing in
p
h = Second, when
p
h $ 0
the condition is satisfied. And because the derivative of the LHS goes to 0 when 
p
h $4
we know that if the LHS and the RHS cross once, they will cross a second time. If they do
not cross trade makes the elite better o for any relative size of the middle class and the
elite. If they cross, the elite producers are better o with trade both when they are relatively
small or they are relatively large with respect to the middle class. To proof that there is
a crossing is enough to show that when the derivative of both sides are equal, the value of
the LHS is bigger than that of the RHS. This is how I proceed now. The derivatives with
respect to 
p
h are equal when
(1 )
µ
p
h
¶3
=
µ
1 

¶13
>
or rearranging
p
h
=
1 

31@= (45)
I now replace this on the RHS and LHS and check whether LHSARHS, or
3(13)@ A
1
(1 pUH)
(13)(13)@d (1 +
pUH
 !
13
 )
/
µ
1 pUH
(1 )
¶(13)(13)@d
A
!13³
(1 +
pUH
 !
13
 )
´ =
And notice that
³
13pUH
(13)
´(13)(13)@d
 1 and. !
13

(1+
pUH
 !
13
 )
 ? 1= This proofs that there is
an intermediate range of 
p
h for which income of he elite decreases with trade.
We only need to proof now that the first range for which the elite benefits with trade
is bigger than in a model without expropriation, that is, the first time the two curves
cross is for 
p
h ?
13
 $ for some $ A 1= We know that  ? 1 To see this notice that
(1 pUH)
(13)(13)@d A (1 )(13)@d and
( +
pUH

!(1 )) =
(1 )!+ 
(1 ) + 
A !=
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Given that  ? 1 and looking at (45) we know that the point where our two income curves
have the same slop is one in which 
p
h A
13
 = And this means that the second crossing of
the two curves is for 
p
h AA
13
 = That means that if we find that for
p
h =
13
 trade gives
higher income to the elite we are done: the first crossing will be for 
p
h 5
³
13
 >
13
 
31@
´
=
And this is easy to show. Replacing 
p
h in (44) the condition translates into
1 
1 + (13) ! (1 )
(13)@d
(1 pUH)
(13)(13)@d (1 +
pUH
 !
(13)
 )
=
Replacing by pUH it is straightforward to check that this is always the case. This completes
the proof. There is a range
µ
p
h#$
>
#$
p
h
¶
such that inside the range the elite are worse o
with trade and better o outside that range. Also, ph#$
A (13) > that is expropriation allows
the elite to benefit from trade for a bigger range of relative sizes. The cut-o values are the
solution to (44)
7.3.2 Total Welfare
The steps of the proof will be very similar to the discussion for the elite. We want to proof
that there is an intermediate range of 
p
h in which the economy is better o without trade.
Comparing the expressions for total income before and after trade opening to trade reduces
welfare if
(1 +
pUH
 (! )(1 )) (1 
p
UH)
(13)(13)@d
(1 )13)
µ
p
h
¶13

µ
1 +
p
h
(1 + ! ) (1 )(13)@d
¶
=
(46)
Notice again that the LHS is concave and increasing in 
p
h , while the RHS is increasing and
linear in 
p
h = Also when
p
h $ 0> RHS?LHS, which means that when the middle class is
small trade increases welfare. Again we need to find whether the LHS and the RHS cross. If
they do not, trade is always welfare enhancing. If they do, they will cross twice, and trade
will only be welfare enhancing for either small or large 
p
h = Proceeding as before, for the
two curves to have the same slope it has to be the case that
(1 )
µ
p
h
¶3
 = (1 )13>
or
p
h
=
1 

³ 

´1@
> (47)
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where I define
  (1 +
pUH

(! )(1 )) (1 pUH)
(13)(13)@d
  (1 + ! ) (1 )(13)@d =
Replacing (47) in the equation comparing profits, we have that no trade gives a higher welfare
when both curves have the same slope if
 1@3(13)@

 1 +
1 

 1@3(13)@>
or   13> which can be rewritten as
(1 pUH)
(13)(13)@d (1 +
pUH
 (! )(1 ))
(1 + ! )13
 ((1 ))(13)(13)@d =
After some algebra it is easy to see that the LHS is a decreasing function of != And notice
that for ! = 1 ( and pUH = ) this condition is satisfied,
1 + (1 )(1 ) A (1 )13=
Thus for all ! ? 1 the condition is satisfied too. This concludes the proof. There is a range³
p
h >
p
h
´
such that for 
p
h inside that range trade reduces welfare. The cut-o values are
the solution to (46) =
7.4 Proofs for Welfare Analysis with Factor Price Manipulation
Total welfare before and after trade is then
ZISP = zISP + hISP =
h
(> h)

1 
[(> h) (1 pISP)] (1 
p
ISP)
(13)(13)@
+

1 
(1 pISP)
(13)1@
µ
(> h)
(1 pISP)
¶3
ZISP>W = hISP>W =

1 
h=
Remember that whenever (> h) A((1)(1)+)@(1)(1) there is no taxation
in the closed economy. In this case, welfare in the closed economy is higher than with trade
if the following is true,
(> h)13 A >
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where to derive this expression I just manipulate ZISP and ZISP>W and cancel terms.
Notice that we are analyzing the case where (> h) A((1)(1)+)@(1)(1) A 1=
Thus when the elite producers do not set any tax on the middle class in the closed economy
and the economy opens to trade, the whole economy loses.
Whenever there is positive taxation in the closed economy, where the tax rate is given
in Proposition 4, welfare in the closed economy is higher if, after replacing the tax rate and
manipulating the equations,
((> h))(13)@d
13
(1 + (1 h) A h
where I define  = (1)(1)@((1)(1)+)= Notice first that whenever (> h) = 31>
which is the point where taxation starts to be positive in the closed economy, the above
condition is satisfied. Also, if we increase h> the right hand side of the condition goes up,
while the left hand side goes down. In the limit, when h = 1> the condition is not satisfied.
This means that there is a level hISP A  such that the economy as a whole wins when
opening to trade if hISP ? 
h> where hISP is implicitly defined in
((> hISP))
(13)@d
13
(1 + (1 hISP) = 
h
ISP = (48)
Now let us look at what happens to the elite. The elite wins with trade if hISP ? hISP>W =
For (> h)  31 this translates into the following condition, (where recall that in this case
pISP = 0)>
1 A
(> h) 1
(> h)
=
Notice that it is not necessarily the case that when (> h) = 31> the condition is satisfied.
And because ((> h)  1)@(> h) is decreasing in h> if the condition is not satisfied
when (> h) = 31 it will not satisfy for any higher (> h) (lower h> recall that (> h)
is decreasing in h)= If it is satisfied for (> h) = 31> because the right hand side of the
condition is decreasing in h> there will be a hISP ?  such that for 
h ? hISP > the
elite producers do not win with trade. hISP is implicitly defined as
1 =
hISP  1
hISP
(49)
For convenience let us write the condition evaluated in 31.
1 

 ? 1= (50)
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Let us see now what happens for (> h) ? 31 (positive taxation in the closed economy).
In this case, replacing the tax rate by its expression, the elite producers win with trade if
1 

 ((> h))(13)@ ? 1=
Notice that this condition always holds if (1  )/ ? 1 because (> h) ? 1= If this is
not the case, then we need (> h) small enough so as to compensate (hISP big enough),
which translates into a cut o value hISP A  such that the elite wins with trade whenever
h A hISP . The parameter is defined implicitly in
1 


³
(> hISP)
´(13)@
= 1 (51)
This completes the proof.
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8 Appendix B: Figures
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Figure 2
Limited Constraints to the Executive
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